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Hyperdoctrines and the Ontology of Stratified
Semantics
Shay Allen Logan
Abstract I present a version of Kit Fine’s stratified semantics for the logic RWQ
and define a natural family of related structures called RW hyperdoctrines. After
proving that RWQ is sound with respect to RW hyperdoctrines, we show how to
construct, for each stratified model, a hyperdoctrine that verifies precisely the same
sentences. Completeness of RWQ for hyperdoctrinal semantics then follows from
completeness for stratified semantics, which is proved in an appendix. By examining
the base category of RW hyperdoctrines, we find reason to be worried about the
ontology of stratified models.
1 Introduction
Hyperdoctrines, introduced in [14], provide algebraic semantics for a broad range
of formal systems. Saying anything more than this is, unfortunately, a bit difficult
since (as pointed out in [20]) ‘there is no standard terminology for the various kinds
of hyperdoctrine which have been used in categorical logic.’ This is an admittedly
unfortunate situation.
Nonetheless, there are some commonalities among the various features on offer.
Of interest to the project pursued here is that hyperdoctrines of all stripes involve
a base category C and assignments of information to the objects and arrows of C.1
Further, the interpretation of the base category C also remains consistent: its objects
are types and its arrows are terms.2 So there is a natural sense in which hyperdoc-
trines carry ontological information. More concretely, presenting the semantics of a
given theory th as a hyperdoctrine with base category C gives us reason (it would
Shay Allen Logan
Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, USA, e-mail: shay.a.logan@gmail.com
1 For preliminaries on category theory, see e.g. [13].
2 This can be fleshed out more, but it would take us too far afield to do so – the interested reader is
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seem) to think that th presupposes there is a different sort of object corresponding to
every object in C and that there are (perhaps merely possible) objects corresponding
to every arrow in C.
A seemingly quite different sort of structure – Kit Fine’s stratified models; see [9]
– gives the standard semantics for quantified relevance logics. Fine interprets strati-
fied semantics as having an ontology consisting of arbitrary objects. And it is in fact
the case that, once one becomes familiar with the ins and outs of stratified models,
one can squint at the objects lurking in their domains and see arbitrary objects of
the sort described in [8]. One would, of course, like to be able to say something a
bit more concrete than this in defense of the ontology of stratified models. But the
task is quite difficult. This has resulted in a variety of criticisms of stratified models
(see [4] for a recent case of this).
I have previously defended stratified semantics from some of these criticisms
(see [15]). Here I switch sides and instead point out problems. The basic plan is
this: stratified models have the feel of oddly-packaged hyperdoctrines. But if we
repackage stratified models in a way that plays up their hyperdoctrinality, rather
than bringing the blurily-glimpsed arbitrary objects into sharper focus, we instead
find that their base category seems to reflect no coherent ontology at all. Thus, if
presenting a theory as a hyperdoctrine in general limns the ontology of the theory,
we have very good reason to be worried about the ontology of stratified semantics.
This leaves open the possibility of a ‘redemption’ of sorts: perhaps the repackaging
I present here is, despite being the natural option, not the correct one. But we will
have to leave investigation of that question to another time.
Given that stratified semantics was presented as a general purpose semantic the-
ory for a broad range of relevant logics, and given that the purpose of the project is
to show a problem with stratified semantics, there is no reason to examine a broad
range of logics. After all, if there is a problem with its implementation in one of the
logics it was meant to cover, that suffices to demonstrate an issue with the semantics
as a whole. So we will focus attention here on the logic RWQ. This restriction is
motivated by the simple fact that RW occupies a convenient ‘middle’ position in the
usual lattice of relevance logics (see, e.g. the diagram in §4.3 of [21]) and the fact
that, in the author’s experience, RW tends to be a simpler logic to work with than
any of the obvious alternatives.
The paper proceeds as follows. In §2, we cover necessary preliminaries, includ-
ing the definition of the logic RWQ. In §3, we present a version stratified semantics.
Soundness and completeness for RWQ with respect to the version of stratified se-
mantics I present are given in the appendix. §4 introduces the basic notion of an RW
hyperdoctrine. In §5, we prove that RWQ is sound with respect to a hyperdoctrinal
semantics. In §6, we provide a way to build a hyperdoctrine hypT corresponding to
any stratified model T, and show that hypT and T make true exactly the same sen-
tences. Completeness of the hyperdoctrinal semantics is then an immediate corollary
of completeness for the stratified semantics. §7 gives a philosophical conclusion.
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2 Preliminaries
We work in a standard first-order language L with primitive connectives ¬, ∧,
and →, and with ∀ as its only quantifier. Disjunction is defined in the usual way:
φ ∨ψ := ¬(¬φ ∧¬ψ). We will take L to have countably many variables v1,v2, . . . ,
and take Var to be the set of variables. We will typically use variants of v, w, x, y,
and z as metavariables ranging over variables. For X ⊆ Var, we let LX be the set of
wffs whose free variables come from X . Note in particular that it follows from these
definitions that L /0 is the set of sentences and that if X ⊆ Y , then LX ⊆LY .
Following Ross Brady (see [3]) we identify RWQ as the smallest set of wffs
containing every L -instance of the following twelve axioms which is also closed
under all three of the listed rules.
A1 α → α
A2 (α ∧β )→ α
A3 (α ∧β )→ β
A4 ((α → β )∧ (α → γ))→ (α → (β ∧ γ))
A5 (α ∧ (β ∨ γ))→ ((α ∧β )∨ (α ∧ γ))
A6 ¬¬α → α
A7 (α →¬β )→ (β →¬α)
A8 (α → β )→ ((β → γ)→ (α → γ))
A9 α → ((α → β )→ β )
A10 ∀xφ → φ(y/x) where y is free for x in φ .
A11 ∀x(φ → ψ)→ (φ →∀xψ) where x is not free in φ .










For more detail on RWQ or its place in the logical landscape, see [1], [17], or [21].
3 Stratified Semantics
The semantics I give here differs mildly from what is called ‘stratified semantics’
in [9]. Rather than spending a great deal of time comparing and contrasting the
theories, I instead directly prove in the appendix that RWQ is sound and complete
for the semantics I give. I take it to be clear on inspection, however, that the theory
I give is similar enough to Fine’s to deserve the ‘stratified’ moniker.
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Definition 1. A frame is a 6-tuple 〈T, ·, `,≤,P,∗〉 with 〈T, ·〉 a commutative monoid,
` an identity element for 〈T, ·〉,≤ a partial ordering of T , P⊆ T , and ∗ : P−→ P, all
of which must satisfy the following restrictions:
F1 If s≤ t, then s ·u≤ t ·u.
F2 If p ∈ P and s · t ≤ p then there are q1 and q2 in P so that s≤ q1 and q1 · t ≤ p,
and t ≤ q2 and s ·q2 ≤ p.
F4 If t · p≤ q, then t ·q∗ ≤ p∗.
F5 p∗∗ = p.
We will tend to omit ‘·’ and write monoid multiplication using concatenation.
One well-known example of a frame takes T to be the set of theories in an ap-
propriate logic; t1t2 = {B : A→ B ∈ t1 and A ∈ t2} (in [25] this is called the ap-
plication of t1 to t2); ` to be the logic itself (that is, the set of theorems); ≤ to be
the usual set-theoretic containment relation; P to be the set of prime theories; and
t∗ = {φ : ¬φ 6∈ t} (that is, ∗ is the so-called ‘Routley star’).3
Definition 2. A z-model is a triple 〈F,Dom, I〉, where
• F = 〈T, ·, `,≤,P,∗〉 is a frame,
• Dom is a nonempty set (the domain),
• I is function mapping variables to Dom and n-ary predicates to functions from T
to subsets of Domn. We require that I satisfy two conditions:





Definition 3. If G = 〈F,Dom, I〉 is a z-model, t ∈ F , and a and b are distinct mem-
bers of Dom, then we say t is symmetric in a and b when for all R, 〈d1, . . . ,dk−1,a,dk+1, . . . ,dn〉 ∈
I(t)(R) iff 〈d1, . . . ,dk−1,b,dk+1, . . . ,dn〉 ∈ I(t)(R).
Definition 4. A stratified model consists of the following data:
• For each finite X ⊆Var, a z-model T(X) = 〈TX , ·X , `X ,≤X ,PX ,∗X ,DomX , IX 〉 and
a function mapping each pair 〈a,b〉 ∈DomX×DomX to a closure operator a[−]bX :
TX −→ TX .4
• For each finite X ⊆ Y , monotonic functions ↓YX : TY → TX and ↑YX : TX → TY .
We require that these data satisfy the following conditions:
SM1 If X ⊆ Y , then DomX ⊆ DomY .
SM2 a[t]bX is symmetric in a and b; if t is already symmetric in a and b, then
a[t]bX = t.
3 The Routley star was introduced by Routley and Routley in [23]. For more on how to interpret it,
see [6] or [22]. An anonymous referee helpfully points out that there are precursors to the Routley
star in the history of logic, some of which are helpfully surveyed in [5, §4.3-4.4]. Here, Dunn
amusingly reports that [23] ‘more or less just springs [the star operator] on the reader’.
4 Since a[−]bX is a closure operator, we have that, t ≤
a[t]bX for all t; if t ≤ u then
a[t]bX ≤
a[u]bX ; anda[a[t]bX ]bX = a[t]bX .
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SM3 If p ∈ PX , then a[p]bX ∈ PX and





SM5 If a[s]bX ≤ p ∈ PX , then there is a t with s≤ t,
a[t]bX ≤ p and
a[t]bX ∈ PX .
SM6 `X↑YX = `Y .
SM7 t↓ZY↓YX = t↓ZX ; t↑YX↑ZY = t↑ZX .
SM8 t↑YX↓YX = t,
SM9 If X ∩W = Y , then t↓XY ↑WY = t↑VX↓VW for all V ⊇ X ∪W .
SM10 t↓YX↑YX ≤ t.
SM11 (tu)↑YX = t↑YX u↑YX .
SM12 (tu↑YX )↓YX ≤ t↓YX u.
SM13 If x ∈ X ∩Y , then IX (x) = IY (x).5
SM14 If R is n-ary, then IY (t)(R)∩DomnX = IX (t↓YX )(R).
SM15 If t↓YX ≤ p ∈ PX then for some q ∈ PY , t ≤ q and q↓YX = p.
SM16 PY↓YX ⊆ PX and for p ∈ PY , p∗↓YX = (p↓YX )∗.

















If T is a stratified model, X ⊆ Var is finite, φ ∈LX , and t ∈ T(X), then we define
T,X , t  φ as follows:
• T,X , t  Px1 . . .xn iff 〈IX (x1), . . . , IX (xn)〉 ∈ IX (t)(P)
• T,X , t  φ ∧ψ iff T,X , t  φ and T,X , t  ψ
• T,X , t  ¬φ iff T,X , p∗ 6 φ for all t ≤ p ∈ PX .
• T,X , t  φ → ψ iff for all u, if T,X ,u  φ then T,X , tu  ψ .
• T,X , t  ∀xφ(x) iff T,Y, t↑YX  φ(y) for some Y ) X and y ∈ Y −X .
If φ(y1, . . . ,yn) 6∈LX and y1, . . . ,yn are the free variables in φ that are not in X then
T,X , t  φ when T,X , t  φ(y1/x1,y2/x2, . . . ,yn/xn) for all 〈x1, . . . ,xn〉 ∈ Xn.
We say that φ is valid in T (and we write T  φ ) when T,X , `X  φ for all X . We
say φ is valid in the class of models K when T  φ for every T ∈ K. We take Str
to be the class of all stratified models. In the appendices we present proofs (lightly
modified from those in [9]) showing that Str  φ iff φ ∈ RWQ.
For more on stratified models, the reader is encouraged to read [9] or [10]. The
only two further resources on stratified semantics that I am aware of are [16] and
[15]. To best understand stratified models, it is useful to contrast them with the
alternative semantics presented in [18], which has been further examined by Shawn
Standefer in as-yet unpublished material.
5 Context will in general suffice to determine whether we mean, e.g. IX (x) or IY (x), and where
context doesn’t so determine this feature guarantees that it doesn’t matter. So we will tend to just
write I(x).
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4 RW hyperdoctrines
As noted, there is little standardization when it comes to hyperdoctrines. So it’s
worthwhile to state explicitly that the definition we will use is modeled on the defi-
nition found in [19], which loosely follows [20] and [12].
In general, things that are called hyperdoctrines are contravariant functors from
a category that has finite products to a category of small categories. The image of
said functor is usual required to be contained in the category of algebras that provide
algebraic models of the propositional version of whatever logic we’re interested in.
Quantifiers then arise naturally as adjoints to the functorial images of the arrows in
the base category.
We also mentioned in the introduction that the base category is typically taken
to have as its objects the types in whatever language we are interpreting. Since L
has a single sort of object, L ’s type theory is rather boring: for each n≥ 1, it has a
type consisting of n-tuples of members of the domain, and that’s it. So it’s natural
to identify L ’s types with the category TL that has (nonempty) finite products and
is generated by a single object. The arrows in TL then correspond in a natural way
to the actual terms – that is, the strings of variables. Modulo a little fiddling, all this
is exactly as described in [24].
Familiar as TL is, T
op
L is yet more familiar: it’s the category with finite coproducts
generated by one object, which is just the category of (nonzero) finite ordinals. And
since a contravariant functor with domain TL is the same thing as a covariant func-
tor with domain TopL , one natural way to present an L -hyperdoctrine is as a covari-
ant functor FinOrd+ −→ Cat (where FinOrd+ is the category of (nonzero) finite
ordinals and inclusions) satisfying some conditions.
These considerations give us reason to be ok with covariant hyperdoctrines. But it
does leave us expecting the base category to be something nice like FinOrd. But the
natural choice of base category for a hyperdoctrinal version of stratified semantics
is not so nice.
Intuitively, the operation ‘↑YX ’ in a stratified model represents the inclusion of LX
into LY , while the operation
a[−]bY represents represents the imposition of some sort
of equivalence relation on the domain and corresponding varieties of equivariance
on the other machinery. So, intuitively, a category capturing this should have as its
objects the finite subsets of Var and as arrows everything generated by the inclusion
and ‘impose an equivalence relation’ operations. That’s a rather vague and inchoate
motivation; nonetheless it suffices as a motivation for taking our hyperdoctrines to
have the category EqRln, which we now define, as their domain:
Definition 5. We define the category EqRln as follows:
• The objects of EqRln are the finite sets of variables.
• The arrows of EqRln are triples 〈X ,Y,∼〉 where X ⊆ Y and ∼ is an equivalence
relation on Y . Such a triple is a morphism from X to Y .
• If 〈Y,Z,∼1〉 and 〈X ,Y,∼2〉 are composable arrows, then their composition is
〈X ,Z,∼3〉, where∼3 is the transitive closure of the relation∼′3 that we define by
saying x∼′3 y iff either x∼1 y or x∼2 y.
Hyperdoctrines and the Ontology of Stratified Semantics 7
• It follows that the triple 〈X ,X , idX 〉 (where idX is the identity relation on X) thus
plays the role of the identity arrow at X .
It’s not completely obvious that composition in EqRln is associative, or that the
relation ∼3 will in general be symmetric. We’ll pause to prove the former; similar
techniques can be used to prove the latter.
Lemma 1. If f , g, and h are arrows in EqRln, then ( f ◦g)◦h = f ◦ (g◦h)
Proof. Suppose z1 ∼( f◦g)◦h z2. Then there are y1, . . . ,yn so that y1 = z1, yn = z2, and
y1 ∼′( f◦g)◦h y2 ∼
′
( f◦g)◦h · · · ∼
′
( f◦g)◦h yn. Thus for all 1≤ i≤ n−1, either yi ∼
′
f◦g yi+1
or y1 ∼h yi+1. Suppose that in fact for k ∈ K, yik ∼ f◦g yik+1 while for j 6∈ K, yi j ∼h
yi j+1. Then for each k ∈ K, there are yk1 . . .ykmk with yik = y
k
1 and yik+1 = y
k
mk and
yk1 ∼′f◦g yk2 ∼′f◦g · · · ∼′f◦g ykmk . Thus, for each 1 ≤ l ≤ mk− 1, either y
k
l ∼ f ykl+1 or
ykl ∼g ykl+1.
But if ykl ∼g ykl+1, then ykl ∼g◦h ykl+1. So for each 1≤ l ≤mk−1, either ykl ∼ f ykl+1
or ykl ∼g◦h ykl+1. Thus for each k ∈ K, yik ∼′f◦(g◦h) yik+1. Also, for j 6∈ K, since yi j ∼h
yi j+1, yi j ∼g◦h yi j+1, and thus yi j ∼ f◦(g◦h) yi j+1. Thus z1 ∼ f◦(g◦h) z2.
A similar argument gives the converse.
Some further notes:
• We identify the inclusion X ↪−→ Y with the triple 〈X ,Y, idY 〉.
• If f : X −→ Y , we will write ∼ f for the equivalence relation associated to f ,
write f |X for the obvious restriction of f to an arrow X −→ X , and write f+ for
the obvious extension of f to an arrow Y −→ Y .
• The reader familiar with hyperdoctrinal matters is likely to have grave concerns
about using EqRln as our base category. These concerns are entirely warranted.
We will return to discuss this matter in §7.
One more difference between hyperdoctrines as I defined here and hyperdoc-
trines as defined elsewhere is worth noting. Typically, in a hyperdoctrine left ad-
joints of certain arrows semantically correspond to existential quantification and
right adjoints of these same arrows semantically correspond to universal quantifi-
cation. However, a convenient feature of the axiomatization of RWQ given in §2 is
that it requires only universal quantification. This allows us to shorten our defini-
tion by stating all required features in terms of right adjoints alone. Finally, since
(as is proved in, e.g. [7], a slightly corrected version of which can be found in [2])
frames give a natural quasi-algebraic semantics for RW, we will map to the cate-
gory Frame whose objects are frames and whose arrows (the frame morphisms) we
define as follows:
Definition 6. If F and G are frames, then a monotonic function µ : F→G is a frame
morphism when (a) for all t and u in F , µ(tu)≤ µ(t)µ(u), and (b) if µ(t)≤ p ∈ PG,
then µ(t)≤ µ(q)≤ p for some t ≤ q ∈ PF . We say a frame morphism is exact when
µ(tu) = µ(t)µ(u).
Definition 7. An RW-hyperdoctrine is a functor H : EqRln−→ Cat such that
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RH1 The image of H is in Frame.
RH2 For each f : X −→ X , if t ∈ H(X) then t ≤ H f (t); if p ∈ PX , then H f (p) ∈ PX ;
H f (tH f (u)) = H f (t)u; and H f (H f (p)∗) = H f (p)∗.
RH3 For each inclusion ι = 〈X ,Y, idY 〉, Hι is exact and has a right adjoint Πι :
H(Y )−→ H(X). We will generally write these morphisms HX⊆Y and ΠX⊆Y .
RH4 For all f : X −→Y , ΠX⊆Y (H f (t))≤H f |X (t); ΠX⊆Y (PY )⊆PX ; and ΠX⊆Y (p
∗)=
(ΠX⊆Y (p))∗.











RH6 If s ∈ H(X) and t ∈ H(Y ), then ΠX⊆Y (HX⊆Y (s)t)≤ sΠX⊆Y (t).6
Lemma 2. ΠY⊆Z ◦ΠX⊆Y = ΠX⊆Z
Proof. It’s easy to check that ΠY⊆Z ◦ΠX⊆Y is a right adjoint to HX⊆Z . Thus ΠY⊆Z ◦
ΠX⊆Y and ΠX⊆Z are isomorphic. But since everything in sight is a poset, this just
means that they’re identical.
Some notational conventions will be useful: we will write x and y for strings of
variables. Given a string of variables x = x1x2 . . .xn, we will write |x| for its under-
lying set; that is for {x1,x2, . . . ,xn} in this case. If f : X −→ Y , then we say x ∼ f y
iff xi ∼ f yi for all i.
Definition 8. Given an RW hyperdoctrine H, an assignment for H is a function α
mapping each atomic formula Rx and finite set of variables X to a set of theories
α(X ,Rx). We require that assignments satisfy the following conditions:
A1 If s ∈ α(X ,Rx) and s≤ t then t ∈ α(X ,x).
A2 If {p : t ≤ p ∈ PX} ⊆ α(X ,Rx), then t ∈ α(X ,Rx).
A3 If f : X −→ Y , then H f (t) ∈ α(Y,Ry) iff H f (t) ∈ α(Y,Rz) for all z∼ f y.
A4 If |x| ⊆ X , then ΠX⊆Y (t) ∈ α(X ,Rx) iff t ∈ α(Y,Rx).
Lemma 3. ΠX⊆Y (HX⊆Y (t)) = t
Proof Sketch: By adjointness, t ≤Π(H(t)), and by RH4, Π(H(t))≤ HidX (t) = t.
Lemma 4. If |x| ∈ X, then t ∈ α(X ,Rx) iff HX⊆Y (t) ∈ α(Y,Rx).
6 Category-theorists often call conditions that make mention of features internal to the objects in
a category evil. Both RH2 and RH4 have a bit too much ‘evil’ in them to win broad approbation
from categorially-minded folks. I have a sneaking suspicion that they both conditions can, with
proper reformulation of other parts of the theory, be avoided or at least made less evil, but have not
been able to do so on my own to this point.
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Proof Sketch: Apply A4 and the previous lemma.
Lemma 5. If f : X →Y , then if HX⊆Y (t) ∈ α(Y,Ry), then H f (t) ∈ α(Y,Ry) as well.
Proof. To begin, notice that we can rewrite f as the inclusion X ⊆ Y followed by
f+ = 〈Y,Y,∼ f 〉. Thus H f (t) = H f+(HX⊆Y (t)). So by RH2, HX⊆Y (t) ≤ H f (t), and
thus by A1, if HX⊆Y (t) ∈ α(Y,Ry), then H f (t) ∈ α(Y,Ry) as required.
For φ ∈ LX , we define truth in H relative to the set X , the theory t, and the
assignment α as follows:
• H,X , t,α  Rx iff t ∈ α(X ,Rx).
• H,X , t,α  φ ∧ψ iff H,X , t,α  φ and H,X , t,α  ψ .
• H,X , t,α  φ → ψ iff for all u, if H,X ,u,α  φ , then H,X , tu,α  ψ .
• H,X , t,α  ¬φ iff H,X , p∗,α 6 φ for all t ≤ p ∈ PY .
• H,X , t,α  ∀xφ(x) iff for some y 6∈ X , H,X ∪{y},HX⊆X∪{y}(t),α  φ(y).
Let X ( Y , |x| ⊆ X and |y| ⊆ Y −X . Then H,X , t,α  φ(xy) iff for all H,X , t,α 
φ(xz) for all appropriate-length sequences z with |z| ⊆ X .
In general, we will write X , t  φ in place of H,X , t,α  φ .7 We say that φ is
valid in H relative to α (and write H,α  φ ) when H,X , `X ,α  φ for all X . We
say φ is valid in H (and write H  φ ) when H,α  φ for all α . We say that φ is
valid (and write hyp  φ ) when H  φ for all H. Note that we will use ‘’ when
discussing matters related to stratified models and use ‘’ for the corresponding
hyperdoctrinal matters.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is this: we will first prove soundness
of RWQ for RW hyperdoctrines. Then we will show how to repackage any given
stratified model as an equivalent (in the sense specified below in Theorem 3) RW
hyperdoctrine. Completeness for the hyperdoctrinal semantics is an immediate con-
sequence of this theorem.
5 Soundness for RW hyperdoctrines
In this section we show that if φ ∈ RWQ, then hyp  φ . Throughout, let H be an
RW hyperdoctrine, α be an assignment for H, and X be a finite set of variables.
We use the following abbreviations: IH=defthe inductive hypothesis; OH=deforder
heredity (Lemma 6); AH=defadjoint heredity (Lemma 8).
Lemma 6 (Order Heredity). If s≤ t then X ,s  φ only if X , t  φ .
Proof. By a straightforward induction on φ .
Lemma 7. If f : X → Y , then Y,H f (t)  φ(y) iff Y,H f (t)  φ(z) for all z∼ f y.
7 The Y ’s contain the kind of information (viz. where in the hyperdoctrine one is doing the evalu-
ating) that is easy to lose track of, so we will in general not omit them.
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Proof. By induction on φ . For atoms, the result is immediate from Lemma 5. The
‘if’ direction is trivial for all cases; as are both directions of the conjunction case.
We consider the ‘only if’ directions for the remaining cases below.
Suppose Y,H f (t) 6 ¬ψ(z) for some z∼ f y. Then Y, p∗  ψ(z) for some H f (t)≤
p ∈ PY . Since H f is a frame morphism, there is a t ≤ q ∈ PY with H f (t)≤ H f (q)≤
p ∈ PY . Since H f (q) ≤ p, p∗ ≤ H f (q)∗. Thus Y,H f (q)∗  ψ(z). Recall from the
proof of Lemma 5 that H f = H f+ ◦HX⊆Y . Using RH2 we have that H f+(H f (q)∗) =
H f+(H f+(HX⊆Y (q))∗) = H f+(HX⊆Y (q))∗ = H f (q)∗. So by IH, Y,H f (q)∗  ψ(w)
for all w∼ f f . Thus in particular Y,H f (q)∗  ψ(y). So Y,H f (t) 6 ¬ψ(y).
Suppose Y,H f (t) 6 ψ1(z)→ ψ2(z) for some z ∼ f y. Then there is a u so that
Y,u  ψ1(z) but Y,H f (t)u 6 ψ2(z). As before we write H f = H f+ ◦HX⊆Y . Now
observe that
H f (t)u = H f+(HX⊆Y (t))u
= H f+(H f+(HX⊆Y (t)))u
= H f+(H f+(HX⊆Y (t))H f+(u))
Thus by IH, Y,H f (t)u 6 ψ2(y). But also note that
H f (t)u = H f+(H f+(HX⊆Y (t))H f+(u))
≥ H f+(HX⊆Y (t))H f+(u)
= H f (t)H f+(u)
So by OH, Y,H f (t)H f+(u) 6ψ2(y). But since u≤H f+(u), we also have Y,H f+(u)
ψ1(z). So by IH, Y,H f (u)  ψ1(y). Thus Y,H f (t) 6 ψ1(y)→ ψ2(y).
For universals, Y,H f (t) ∀xψ(yx) iff for some w 6∈Y , Y ∪{w},HY⊆Y∪{w}(H f (t))
ψ(yw). Let ι1 be the inclusion 〈Y,Y ∪{w}, idY∪{w}〉, and ι2 be the inclusion 〈X ,X ∪
{w}, idX∪{w}〉. Finally, let∼ f⊕id{w} be the equivalence relation on Y ∪{w} generated
by∼ f and id{w} and let f ⊕ id{w} = 〈X ∪{w},Y ∪{w},∼ f⊕id{w}〉. The key observa-
tion is that ι1◦ f =( f⊕id{w})◦ι2. Thus HY⊆Y∪{w}(H f (t))=H f⊕id{w}(HX⊆X∪{w}(t)).
Thus Y,H f (t)  ∀xψ(yx) iff for some w 6∈ Y , Y ∪ {w},H f⊕id{w}(HX⊆X∪{w}(t)) 
ψ(yw) iff (by IH) for some w 6∈ Y , Y ∪ {w},H f⊕id{w}(HX⊆X∪{w}(t))  ψ(zw) for
all z ∼ f y iff for some w 6∈ Y , Y ∪{w},HY⊆Y∪{w}(H f (t))  ψ(zw) for all z ∼ f y iff
Y,H f (t)  ∀xψ(zx) for all z∼ f y.
Lemma 8 (Adjoint Heredity). If φ ∈LX , then X ,ΠX⊆Y (t)  φ iff Y, t  φ .
Proof. By induction on φ . The atomic case follows from A4. The conjunction and
negation cases are left to the reader. For conditionals, suppose Y, t  φ → ψ and
let X ,u  φ . By Lemma 3, X ,ΠX⊆Y (HX⊆Y (u))  φ . So by IH, Y,HX⊆Y (u)  φ . So
Y, tHX⊆Y (u)  ψ . By IH X ,ΠX⊆Y (tHX⊆Y )  ψ . But by RH6 and commutativity,
ΠX⊆Y (tHX⊆Y )≤ΠX⊆Y (t)u. So by OH, X ,ΠX⊆Y (t)u  ψ . Thus X ,ΠX⊆Y (t)  φ →
ψ .
Now suppose X ,ΠX⊆Y (t)  φ → ψ . Let Y,u  φ . By IH, X ,ΠX⊆Y (u)  φ . Thus
X ,ΠX⊆Y (t)ΠX⊆Y (u)  ψ . So by Lemma 3, X ,ΠX⊆Y (HX⊆Y (ΠX⊆Y (t)ΠX⊆Y (u))) 
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ψ . Thus by IH, Y,HX⊆Y (ΠX⊆Y (t)ΠX⊆Y (u))  ψ . But HX⊆Y (ΠX⊆Y (t)ΠX⊆Y (u)) =
HX⊆Y (ΠX⊆Y (t))HX⊆Y (ΠX⊆Y (u))≤ tu. So by OH, Y, tu  ψ . So Y, t  φ → ψ .
Finally, we turn to the universal case. First note that by RH5, the following com-
mutes for any z 6∈ Y :







Y ∪{z}= (X ∪{z})∪ (Y −X)
ΠX∪{z}⊆Y∪{z}
// X ∪{z}
Thus HX⊆X∪{z} ◦ΠX⊆Y = ΠX∪{z}⊆Y∪{z} ◦HY⊆Y∪{z}. Notice that Y, t  ∀xψ(x) iff
for some z 6∈ Y , Y ∪ {z},HY⊆Y∪{z}(t)  ψ(z), iff (by IH) for some z 6∈ Y , X ∪
{z},ΠX∪{z}⊆Y∪{z}(HY⊆Y∪{z}(t))ψ(z) iff for some z 6∈Y , X∪{z},HX⊆X∪{z}(ΠX⊆Y (t))
ψ(z). What remains is to prove that X ,ΠX⊆Y (t)  ∀xψ(x) iff for some z 6∈ Y ,
X ∪{z},HX⊆X∪{z}(ΠX⊆Y (t))  ψ(z).
The ‘if’ direction is immediate. For the ‘only if’ direction, suppose X ,ΠX⊆Y (t)
∀xψ(x). Then for some w 6∈ X , X ∪ {w},HX⊆X∪{w}(ΠX⊆Y (t))  ψ(w). Choose
w 6= z 6∈Y . Since ΠX∪{w}⊆X∪{z,w}(HX∪{w}⊆X∪{z,w}(s)) = s for all s, IH gives that X∪
{z,w},HX∪{w}⊆X∪{z,w}(HX⊆X∪{w}(ΠX⊆Y (t)))ψ(w). Thus HX⊆X∪{z,w}(ΠX⊆Y (t))
ψ(w).
Define ∼ f so that z ∼ f w, w ∼ f z, and for all v ∈ X ∪ {z,w}, v ∼ f v. Let
f = 〈X ∪ {z,w},X ∪ {z,w},∼ f 〉 and f− = 〈X ,X ∪ {z,w},∼ f 〉. By RH2 and OH,
H f (HX⊆X∪{z,w}(ΠX⊆Y (t)))ψ(w). Thus by the previous lemma, H f (HX⊆X∪{z,w}(ΠX⊆Y (t)))
ψ(z). But clearly H f ◦HX⊆X∪{z,w}=H f− . Thus by IH, ΠX∪{z}⊆X∪{z,w}(H f−(ΠX⊆Y (t)))
ψ(z). So by RH4, H f−|X∪{z}(ΠX⊆Y (t))) ψ(z). But H f−|X∪{z} = HX⊆X∪{z}, so as re-
quired for some z 6∈ Y , X ∪{z},HX⊆X∪{z}(ΠX⊆Y (t))  ψ(z).
Lemma 9. If X , t  ∀yφ(y), then X , t  φ(x) for all x ∈ X.
Proof. Let X , t  ∀yφ(y) and x ∈ X . Let ∼ f be the equivalence relation given by
the following three conditions: (i) z ∼ f z for all z ∈ X ∪{y}, (ii) x ∼ f y, and (iii)
y∼ f x. Finally, let f = 〈X ,X ∪{y},∼ f 〉. Notice that H f+(HX⊆X∪{y}(t)) = H f (t). So
by RH2, HX⊆X∪{y}(t) ≤ H f (t). Next note that X ∪{y},HX⊆X∪{y}(t)  φ(y). Thus
by OH, X ∪{y},H f (t)  φ(y). So by the previous lemma, X ∪{y},H f (t)  φ(x).
Thus by AH, X ,ΠX⊆X∪{y}(H f (t))  φ(x). So by RH4 and OH, X ,H f |X (t)  φ(x),
which is to say X , t  φ(x).
Lemma 10. X , t  φ iff X , p  φ for all t ≤ p ∈ PX .
Proof. One direction follows from OH; the other from a straightforward induction
on φ .
Lemma 11. X , t  φ ∨ψ iff X , p  φ or X , p  ψ for all t ≤ p ∈ PX .
Proof. By fiddling. See the corollary to Theorem 1 in [7] for a proof sketch.
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Theorem 1 (Soundness). If φ ∈ RWQ, then hyp  φ .
Proof. By straightforward induction on the proof of φ .
6 Correspondence Between Stratified Models and
hyperdoctrines
We will now provide a construction that takes a stratified model T and produces an
‘equivalent’ RW hyperdoctrine hypT. We first introduce a convenient bit of notation:
if x = x1x2 . . .xn and y = y1y2 . . .yn, then
x[t]yX =
xn[...[x2[x1 [t]y1X ]y2X ]...X ]ynX
We will also write n× x for the sequence containing n x’s. To see this notation in
action, we prove a few lemmas:
Lemma 12. If |x1|∩ (Y −X) = /0 and |x2|∩ (Y −X) = /0, then
x1[t↑YX]x2Y = x1 [t]x1X ↑YX
Proof. By repeated application of SM17.
Lemma 13. If |y1|∩X = /0 and |y2|∩X = /0, then
y1[t↑YX]y2Y ≤ t↑YX
Proof. By repeated application of the fact that a[−]bY is a closure operator.







Proof. By repeated application of SM18.
Definition 9. Let T be a stratified model. Then we define hypT as follows:
• If T(X)= 〈TX , ·X , `X ,≤X ,PX ,∗X ,DomX ,Dom, IX 〉, then hypT(X)= 〈TX , ·X , `X ,≤X
,PX ,∗X 〉.
• Let X = |x1| ∪ |x2| ∪ · · · ∪ |xn| and suppose further that the |xi| are the ∼ f -
equivalence classes. (We will show below that which sequences xi we choose
is irrelevant). Finally, suppose that for each i, x1i is the first member of xi and that
xi has length li. Then hypTf (t) =
l1×x11...ln×x1n[t↑YX]x1...xnY . Since this is still quite
cumbersome, we will write this as
li×x1i [t↑YX]xiY .








• ΠX⊆Y = ↓XY (we show below that ↓XY actually is right adjoint to ↑XY ).
I claim that hypT, so defined, is an RW hyperdoctrine. I also claim that there is
an assignment αT that we can associate to T in a natural way such that T,X , t  φ
iff hypT,X , t,αT  φ . Before we can prove either of these claims, we first need to
demonstrate that hypT is well-defined.
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Lemma 15. If |a|= |b| and |c|= |d|, then a[t]cX =
b[t]dX .
Proof Sketch: Use brute force to show that
a2[a1 [t]b1X ]b2X = a1[a2 [t]b2X ]b1X , then note
that the result follows from this.
Lemma 16. Let X be a finite set of variables and C a subset of X. Let |c| = C
and |d| = C. Finally, suppose c has length n and d has length m. Then n×c1 [t]cX =
m×d1 [t]dX .
Proof Sketch: We prove the result in a simple case that demonstrates the general




To begin, note that by SM2, x1 [t]x1X ≤ t, but also since
x1 [−]x1X is a closure operator, t ≤x1 [t]x1X . Thus
x1 [−]x1X is the identity map. So it will suffice to show that
x1,x1 [t]x2,x3X =x2,x2 [t]x1,x3X .
By SM2 and the fact that the various −[−]−−-operators are closure operators,
x1,x1 [t]x2,x3X is symmetric both in x1 and x2 and in x1 and x3. So by the definition
of ‘symmetric’, x1,x1 [t]x2,x3X is symmetric in x2 and x1 and in x2 and x3. By a similar
argument we see that x2,x2 [t]x1,x3X is symmetric both in x1 and x2 and in x1 and x3.




But by the previous lemma, x1,x1,x2,x2 [t]x2,x3,x1,x3X =
x2,x2,x1,x1 [t]x1,x3,x2,x3X , so
x1,x1 [t]x2,x3X =x2,x2 [t]x1,x3X .
Lemma 17. hypTf is well-defined.
Proof. By the previous two lemmas, neither the choice of representing sequence xi
for the equivalence class |xi| nor the order of the equivalence classes matters.
Lemma 18. If x[t]yX ≤ p ∈ PX , then for some t ≤ s,
x[s]yX ≤ p and
x[s]yX ∈ PX .
Proof. If x and y have length 1, the result follows from SM5. So suppose x= x̃xn and
y= ỹyn for some n≥ 2. Then x[t]yX =
xn[x̃[t]ỹX]ynX ≤ p∈PX . By SM5, for some x̃[t]ỹX ≤
s, xn [s]ynX ≤ p, and
xn [s]ynX ∈ PX . First note that since t ≤
x̃[t]ỹX , t ≤ s as well. Next
notice that since x̃[t]ỹX ≤ s, s is symmetric in x̃ and ỹ. Thus since s ≤
xn [s]ynX ,
xn [s]ynX
is symmetric in x̃ and ỹ as well. So x̃
[xn [s]ynX ]ỹX = xn [s]ynX . But also by Lemma 15,
x̃[xn [s]ynX ]ỹX = xn[x̃[s]ỹX]ynX = x[s]yX . Thus x[s]yX ≤ p and x[s]yX ∈ PX , as required.












Y ≤ p ∈ PY for some t ≤ q ∈ PX .
Proof. By the previous lemma, for some t↑YX ≤ s,
x[s]yY ≤ p and
x[s]yY ∈ PY . I claim
x[s]yY↓
Y
X (which is in PX by SM16) does the job. To see this, first note that since
t↑YX ≤ s≤













x[x[s]yY↓YX↑YX]yY . Finally note that x[x[s]yY↓YX↑YX]yY ≤ x[x[s]yY ]yY = x[s]yY ≤ p.
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Proof Sketch: Going through all the details is a notational nightmare, so we will
only give the general idea, which is this: if we can show that hypTf (hyp
T
g (t)) is
symmetric in z1 and z2 whenever z1 ∼ f◦g z2, then using tricks from the proofs of
previous, similar lemmas, we can show that hypTf◦g(t)≤ hypTf (hypTg (t)). If we can
show that hypTf◦g(t) is symmetric in z1 and z2 whenever z1 ∼ f z2 or z1 ∼g z2, then
we can show that hypTf (hyp
T
g (t))≤ hypTf◦g(t). But both of these follow easily from
the definition of ∼ f◦g, proving the lemma.
Theorem 2. If T is a stratified model, then hypT is an RW hyperdoctrine.
Proof. We must verify that hypT satisfies RH1-RH6. For RH1, we need to show that
hypT is a functor whose image is in Frame. The only difficult parts are showing that
hypTf is a frame morphism (but this follows from monotonicity for ↑, SM4, the fact




f ◦hypTg . The
latter follows from Lemma 20
For RH2 we need to show that for each f : X −→ X ,
(a) If t ∈ hypT(X) then t ≤ hypTf (t);
(b) If p ∈ PX , then hypTf (p) ∈ PX ;
(c) hypTf (thyp
T






∗) = hypTf (p)∗.
(a) follows from the fact that each a[−]bX is a closure operator. (b) and (d) follow






a[t]bX u. For the converse







≤ a[u]bX t by SM4















For RH3, we need that ↑YX is exact and that ↓YX is right adjoint to ↑YX . Exactness
follows from SM11. For adjointness, it suffices to show that s↑YX ≤ t iff s≤ t↓YX . So,
suppose s↑YX ≤ t. Then by SM8 s↑YX↓YX = s ≤ t↓YX . Now suppose that s ≤ t↓YX . Then
by SM10 s↑YX ≤ t↓YX↑YX ≤ t.
For RH4 we need that hypTf (t)↓YX ≤ hypTf |X (t) (which we deal with below); that
PY↓YX ⊆ PX ; and that (p∗)↓YX = (p↓YX )∗. But both of these follow from SM16, so we
have only the first matter to address.
Say that the pair 〈w,z〉 is of
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• Type 1 if both w and z are in X ;
• Type 2 if both w and z are in Y −X .
• Type 3 if w ∈ X but z ∈ Y −X ; and
By Lemma 15, we can rewrite
li×xi[t↑YX]xiY in the form w1 w2 w3[t↑YX]z1 z2 z3Y where
each pair 〈w1i ,z1i 〉 is type 1, each pair 〈w2i ,z2i 〉 is type 2, and each pair 〈w3i ,z3i 〉 is type































X by Lemma 13
≤ w1 [t]z1X by Lemma 14
= hypTf |X (t)











But since X ∩ Z = /0, it follows that Z ∩ (Y ∪ X) = Z ∩Y = Y . So by SM9,
t↓Y∪XY ↑ZY = t↑Z∪XY∪X↓Z∪XZ .
Finally, for RH6, we need to show that if s ∈ hypT(X) and t ∈ hypT(Y ), and
X ⊆ Y , then (s↑YX t)↓YX ≤ st↓YX . But after a bit of commutativity, this is exactly the
content of SM12.
Definition 10. If T is a stratified model, then αT(X ,Rx) = {s : IX (x) ∈ I(s)(R)}.
Lemma 21. αT is an assignment for hypT
Proof. We need to verify that αT meets conditions A1-A4 from Definition 8. A1,
A2, and A4 are straightforward and left to the reader. For A3, let f : X −→ Y .
hypTf (t) ∈ αT(Y,Ry) iff I(y) ∈ IY (hypTf (t))(R). Let z ∼ f y. By the definition of
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hypTf (t), it is symmetric in z1 and y1 and in z2 and y2, etc. Thus if hyp
T
f (t) ∈
αT(Y,Ry) then I(z) ∈ IY (hypTf (t))(R) for all z∼ f y, which is to say that hypTf (t) ∈
αT(Y,Rz) for all z∼ f y. The converse is trivial.
Theorem 3. For all φ , hypT,X , t,αT  φ iff T,X , t  φ
Proof. By a straightforward induction on φ .
From here, completeness for RW hyperdoctrines is only a short step away:
Corollary 1. If hyp  φ then φ ∈ RWQ.
Proof. Suppose φ 6∈ RWQ. Then there is a stratified model T so that T,X , t 6 φ for
some X and some t ∈ T(X). But then hypT,X , t,αT 6 φ . So hyp 6 φ .
7 Ontology
Recall from the introduction that the standard interpretation of the base category
C of a hyperdoctrine is one of the few constants in the otherwise-unsettled hy-
perdoctrine literature: its objects are types and its arrows are terms. Also recall
that I presented RW hyperdoctrines as a type of covariant functor, but the usual
ontological interpretation of the base category of a hyperdoctrine is given with
respect to contravariant functors. But nothing could be easier to fix: a covariant
functor EqRln −→ Frame is exactly the same thing as a contravariant functor
EqRlnop −→ Frame. Thus the ‘type theory’ associated to an RW hyperdoctrine
is given by the category EqRlnop.
The problem is that this category seems to reflect no coherent ontology at all.
It certainly shows no ontology of arbitrary objects. Expanding on this a bit, the
objects of EqRln are finite sets of variables. Thus, each singleton set {vi} represents
a different type, as does each doubleton set {vi,v j}, etc. But it’s not at all clear why
we should regard distinct variables as distinct types – typically, one would expect
all the variables to be of the same type. What’s worse is that these types aren’t
related to one another in nice ways. For example, singleton types are neither initial
nor terminal (in EqRln, there are two arrows {vi} −→ {vi,v j} and none in the other
direction). And doubleton types are neither products nor sums of their singleton
retractions.
This could perhaps be mollified if we could think of distinct variables as distinct
arbitrary objects. But there’s no clear way to do this. One would expect that if an
ontology of arbitrary objects were to show itself somewhere, it should show itself by
presenting terms – which is to say arrows of EqRlnop – corresponding to different
arbitrary objects. But looking at the simplest case seems to throw water on this way
of reading the terms in EqRlnop. For example, there are two arrows in EqRlnop
from {v1,v2} to {v1}. Focusing only on the equivalence relations, they are
• v1 ∼1 v1;v2 ∼1 v2; and
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• v1 ∼2 v1;v2 ∼2 v2;v1 ∼2 v2;v2 ∼2 v1.
Perhaps we could squint and see ∼2 as a way of regarding v1 as standing arbitrarily
for v1 or for v2. But I see no obvious interpretation of ∼1 at all.
Of course, all this leaves open the possibility that perhaps the repackaging I
present here is, despite being the natural option, not the correct one. Or perhaps
there’s some way to interpret EqRlnop – despite all appearances – as a category of
types and terms. But we will have to leave investigation of these questions to another
time.
Fine, to an extent, acknowledges problems in this neighborhood while introduc-
ing stratified semantics. Here is his discussion of the matter:
In the earlier work, [author’s note: this seems to be a reference to [11, 8]] there exists
an explanation of the truth of statements about arbitrary objects in terms of individuals; a
statement about an arbitrary object is true just in case it is true for all individuals. On the
present account, there is no such explanation. Truths about arbitrary objects are just given;
they are, in my previous terminology, about those objects as objects in their own right.
Another difference is that the notion of dependence is integral to my earlier work, but in the
present account does not even make an appearance.[9, p. 30]
So the situation the relevance logician finds herself in is this: she has available a
technically adequate semantic theory in stratified semantics. There is one philo-
sophical interpretation of this theory that has been – albeit tentatively – put forward.
It involves arbitrary objects. But on closer inspection, it doesn’t seem it can be sus-
tained.
The extent to which this is a problem depends on how serious a role you think
ontological considerations should play in your choice of logic. But if you think they
should play any serious role, it seems your left saying that stratified semantics is, at
best, on shaky footing.
Appendix A: Soundness for Stratified Models
Lemma 22 (HH – Horizontal Heredity). If X ,s  φ and s≤ t, then X , t  φ .
Proof. By a straightforward induction on φ .
Lemma 23. t↓YX u↓YX ≤ (tu)↓YX .
Proof. By fiddling with arrows; the discussion preceding Lemma 1 in [9] has hints.
Lemma 24 (Symmetry). X ,a[t]bX  φ(a) iff X ,
a[t]bX  φ(b).
Proof. By induction on φ . The base case follows from SM2; and the conjunction
case is trivial. In each of the remaining cases, the ‘if’ direction is the same as that
‘only if’ direction, so we deal only with the former.
For the negation case, let X ,a[t]bX 6 ¬ψ(b). Then X , p∗  ψ(b) for some
a[t]bX ≤
p∈ PX . By SM5, for some u with a[u]bX ∈ PX ,
a[t]bX ≤
a[u]bX ≤ p. Thus p∗ ≤ (
a[u]bX )
∗.
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So by HH, X ,(a[u]bX )






∗. Thus by IH,
X ,(a[u]bX )
∗  ψ(a). So X ,a[t]bX 6 ¬ψ(a).
For conditionals, first suppose X ,a[t]bX  φ1(a)→ φ2. Let X ,u  φ1(b). Then by
IH, X ,a[u]bX  φ1(a). Thus X ,
a[t]bX
a[u]bX  φ2. By SM4,
a[t]bX
a[u]bX ≤
a[t]bX u. Thus by
HH, X ,a[t]bX u  φ2 as well. So X ,
a[t]bX  φ1(b)→ φ2.
Suppose instead that X ,a[t]bX  φ1→ φ2(a). Let X ,u  φ1. Then X ,
a[t]bX u  φ2(a).
Thus, by IH, X ,a
[a[t]bX u]bX  φ2(b). But by SM4 and the fact that a[−]bX is a closure
operator, a
[a[t]bX u]bX ≤ a[t]bX u. So by HH X ,a[t]bX u  φ2(b). So X ,a[t]bX  φ1→ φ2(b).









Y  ψ(y,a).The in-









ψ(y,b). Thus X ,a[t]bX  ∀zψ(z,b).
Lemma 25 (DH – Downward Heredity). If X ⊆ Y , and φ ∈ LX then Y, t  φ iff
X , t↓YX  φ .
Proof. By induction on φ . Most cases are straightforward. The universal case is not.
Suppose Y, t  ∀vψ(v). Then Z, t↑ZY  ψ(z) for some Z ) Y and z ∈ Z−Y . Let
W = X ∪ (Z−Y ). Notice that Y ∩W = X . So by SM9, t↑ZY↓ZW = t↓YX↑WX . But by IH,
W, t↑ZY↓ZW  ψ(z). So W, t↓YX↑WX  ψ(z). Thus X , t↓YX  ∀vψ(v).
Now suppose X , t↓YX  ∀kψ(k). Then Z, t↓YX↑ZX  ψ(z) for some Z ) X and z ∈
Z−X . At this point the proof splits into two cases.
Case 1: Suppose z 6∈Y . Notice that t↓YX↑Z∪YX ↓Z∪YZ = t↓YX↑ZX↑Z∪YZ ↓Z∪YZ = t↓YX↑ZX . So
since Z, t↓YX↑ZX  ψ(z), IH gives that Z∪Y, t↓YX↑Z∪YX  ψ(z) as well. But t↓YX↑Z∪YX =
t↓YX↑YX↑Y∪ZY ≤ t↑Z∪YY . So by HH, Z ∪Y, t↑Z∪YY  ψ(z). Since z 6∈ Y , this shows that
Y, t  ∀kψ(k).
Case 2: suppose z ∈ Y . Choose w 6∈ Z ∪Y . Let X+ = X ∪{w}, Y+ = Y ∪{w}




Z = t↓YX↑ZX .
Since Z, t↓YX↑ZX  ψ(z), by IH, Z+ ∪Y+, t↓YX↑Z
+∪Y+
























Z+∪Y+  ψ(w). So since w ∈ X



































Thus by HH, X+, t↓YX↑X
+
X  ψ(w). But since w 6∈ Y , we now find ourselves (after
swapping X+ for Z and w for z) in exactly the same situation as in the previous case.
Thus by the argument given there, Y, t  ∀vψ(v).
Corollary 2. If Y,s↑YX  φ(y) for some Y ) X and y ∈Y −X, then X ,s  φ(x) for all
x ∈ X.
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X ≤ s. So by HH, X ,s  φ(x).
Theorem 4. If φ ∈ RWQ, then Str  φ .
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the proof of φ .
Appendix B: Completeness
We begin with some definitions:
• Write Σ φ when there is a sequence φ1,φ2, . . . ,φn such that φn = φ and for all
1≤ i≤ n, either
– φi ∈ Σ ; or
– For some j < i and k < i, φi = φ j ∧φk; or
– For some j < i, φ j→ φi ∈ RWQ.
• Write Σ k,l φ when there is a sequence φ1,φ2, . . . ,φn such that φn = φ and for all
1≤ i≤ n, either
– φi ∈ Σ ; or
– For some j < i and k < i, φi = φ j ∧φk; or
– For some j < i, φ j→ φi ∈ RWQ; or
– For some j < i, φi = φ j(k/l); or
– For some j < i, φi = φ j(l/k).
• Write φ(x//y) for the result of replacing every occurrence of x in φ with y.
• Write c(Σ) for {φ : Σ φ} and cX (Σ) for {φ ∈LX : Σ φ}.
• Write ck,l(Σ) for {φ : Σ k,l φ} and write ck,lX (Σ) for {φ ∈LX : Σ k,l φ}.
• Say Σ is an X-theory when Σ ⊆LX and for all φ ∈LX , Σ φ only if φ ∈ Σ .
• Say Σ is an Xk,l-theory when Σ ⊆LX and for all φ ∈LX , Σ k,l φ only if φ ∈ Σ .
• We write RWQX for RWQ∩LX .
• Say Σ is X-normal when RWQX ⊆ Σ .
• Say Σ is prime when α ∨β ∈ Σ only if α ∈ Σ or β ∈ Σ .
• Say Σ is closed under disjunction when α ∨β ∈ Σ whenever α ∈ Σ and β ∈ Σ .
Lemma 26 (Deduction Lemma). If α β , then α → β ∈ RWQ.
Lemma 27. If Σ φ(k), k not free in Σ but free for x in φ(k), then Σ ∀xφ(x).
Lemma 28 (Lindenbaum). Suppose ∆ is closed under disjunction, Γ is an X-(or
Xk,l-)theory, and Γ ∩∆ = /0. Then there is a prime X-(or Xk,l-)theory Γ ′ ⊃ Γ such
that Γ ′∩∆ = /0.
Lemma 29. If Γ is a theory and {Γi}i∈I is the set of all prime theories that contain
Γ , then Γ = ∩i∈IΓi
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Lemma 30. For each X, RWQX is a prime X-theory.
For proofs of Lemmas 26-30, see [15]. We also need the following facts about RWQ:
Fact 1 (φ → (ψ → ρ))→ (ψ → (φ → ρ)) ∈ RWQ
Fact 2 φ → (ψ → ((φ → (ψ → ρ))→ ρ)) ∈ RWQ
Fact 3 φ →¬¬φ ∈ RWQ.
Fact 4 φ → (φ ∨ψ) ∈ RWQ.
Fact 5 ¬(φ ∧ψ)→ (¬φ ∨¬ψ) ∈ RWQ.
Fact 6 (φ → ψ)→ (¬ψ →¬φ) ∈ RWQ.
Finally, we will have need of the following two lemmas whose proofs we leave
to the reader:
Lemma 31. ρ k,l ψ iff RWQk,l ρ → ψ iff ρ(l//k)→ ψ(l//k) ∈ RWQ
Lemma 32. If RWQk,l ρ → ψ and Σ k,l ψ → φ , then Σ k,l ρ → φ .
Definition 11. For finite X ⊆Var we define M(X) as 〈TX , ·X ,RWQX ,⊆,ΠX ,∗X ,X , IX 〉,
where TX is the set of X-theories, t ·X u = {ψ : φ → ψ ∈ t and φ ∈ u}, ΠX is the set
of prime X-theories, t∗X = {φ ∈LX : ¬φ 6∈ t}, and IX (t)(P) = {x : Px ∈ t}.
Lemma 33. 〈TX , ·X 〉 is a commutative monoid for which RWQX serves as an identity
element. Further, if a and b are in ΠX and ta⊆ b, then tb∗X ⊆ a∗X , and (a∗X )∗X = a.
Proof. By a straightforward application of the facts and definitions above.
Lemma 34. If p ∈ΠX , then p∗X ∈ΠX .
Proof. We first prove that p∗X is an X-theory. So let φ ∈ LX and p∗X  φ . We
show by induction on the length of the proof witnessing p∗X  φ that φ ∈ p∗X . Let
ψ1, . . . ,ψi = φ be such a proof. If i = 1, then ψ1 = φ ∈ p∗X , so we are done. Now
suppose i > 1. Clearly if ψi ∈ p∗X we are done.
Next suppose for some j < i and k < i, φ = ψ j ∧φk. Then by IH, ψ j ∈ p∗X and
ψk ∈ p∗X . So ¬ψ j and ¬ψk are not in p. So since p is prime, ¬ψ j ∨¬ψk is not in p.
Since p is a theory, it follows by Fact 5 that ¬(ψ j ∧ψk) 6∈ p. So ψ j ∧ψk ∈ p∗X as
required.
Finally, suppose for some j < i, ψ j→ φ ∈ RWQ. Then by inductive hypothesis,
ψ j ∈ p∗X . So ¬ψ j 6∈ p. Since ψ j→ φ ∈RWQ, Fact 6 gives that ¬φ →¬ψ j ∈RWQ.
Thus since p is a theory and ¬ψ j 6∈ p, ¬φ 6∈ p. Thus φ ∈ p∗X as required.
Now we show that p∗X is prime. So, suppose φ ∨ψ ∈ p∗X but that neither φ nor
ψ is in p∗X . Then ¬(φ ∨ψ) 6∈ p but ¬φ ∈ p and ¬ψ ∈ p. Since p is a theory, it
follows that ¬φ ∧¬ψ ∈ p. So by Fact 3, ¬¬(¬φ ∧¬ψ) ∈ p. But by the definition of
‘∨’, ¬¬(¬φ ∧¬ψ) ∈ p gives that ¬(φ ∨ψ) ∈ p, contradicting ¬(φ ∨ψ) 6∈ p. Thus,
either φ ∈ p∗X or ψ ∈ p∗X , so p∗X is prime.
Lemma 35. For all a and b in TX , if p ∈ΠX and ab⊆ p then there are q1 and q2 in
ΠX so that a⊆ q1 and q1b⊆ p, and b⊆ q2 and aq2 ⊆ p.
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Proof Sketch. The result follows from several straightforward applications of the
Lindenbaum lemma, so I leave some of the details to the reader. To begin, let θ1 =
{φ : cX (φ)b 6⊆ p} and let θ2 = {φ : acX (φ) 6⊆ p}. I claim both θ1 and θ2 are closed
under disjunction. To see this for θ1, suppose φ1 and φ2 are in θ1. Then cX (φ1)b 6⊆ p
and cX (φ2)b 6⊆ p. So there are β1, β2, ψ1, and ψ2 so that both for i = 1 and i = 2,
φi  βi → ψi, βi ∈ b, and ψi 6∈ p. By fiddling, it follows from this that φ1 ∨ φ2 
(β1 ∧β2)→ (ψ1 ∨ψ2). But since b is a theory, β1 ∧β2 ∈ b, and since p is prime,
ψ1∨ψ2 6∈ p. Thus cX (φ1∨φ2)b 6⊆ p, so φ1∨φ2 ∈ θ1.
On the other hand, suppose φ1 and φ2 are in θ2. Then acX (φ1) 6⊆ p and acX (φ2) 6⊆
p. So there are α1, α2, ψ1, and ψ2 so both for i = 1 and i = 2, φi  αi, αi → ψi ∈
a, and ψi 6∈ p. By further fiddling, it follows from this that φ1 ∨ φ2  α1 ∨α2 and
(α1∨α2)→ (ψ1∨ψ2) ∈ a and ψ1∨ψ2 6∈ p. So φ1∨φ2 ∈ θ2.
Since ab⊆ p, it’s also clear that a∩θ1 = /0 and b∩θ2 = /0. So by the Lindenbaum
Lemma, there are prime X-theories q1⊇ a with q1∩θ1 = /0 and q2⊇ b with q2∩θ2 =
/0. It follows that q1 and q2 have the features we require.
Theorem 5. 〈TX , ·X ,RWQX ,⊆,ΠX ,∗X ,X , IX 〉 is a z-model for each finite set of vari-
ables X.
Proof. Immediate from the definitions and Lemmas 33-35.
Lemma 36. ca,bX is a closure operator; for all t, c
a,b
X (t) is symmetric in a and b; for
all prime X-theories p, ca,bX (p) is also prime, and if t is already symmetric in a and
b, then ca,bX (t) = t.
Proof. Essentially immediate from the definitions.
Lemma 37. ca,bX ((c
a,b
X (t))
∗X ) = (ca,bX (t))
∗X .
Proof. It suffices to show that ca,bX ((c
a,b
X (t))
∗X ) ⊆ (ca,bX (t))∗X , the converse contain-
ment being a corollary of the previous lemma.
Since (ca,bX (t))
∗X is obviously an X-theory all we need to show is that it’s an
Xa,b-theory. So let φ(a) ∈ (ca,bX (t))∗X . Then ¬φ(a) 6∈ c
a,b
X (t). Thus since c
a,b
X (t) is an









Proof. Let φ ∈ ca,bX (tu). Then tu a,b φ . Thus, for some ψ ∈ tu, ψ a,b φ . So there
is a ρ ∈ u ⊆ ca,bX (u) with ρ → ψ ∈ t ⊆ c
a,b




X (u). So since
ca,bX (t)c
a,b
X (u) is an X









Proof. Let φ ∈ ca,bX (t)c
a,b
X (t). Then there is a ψ ∈ c
a,b
X (u) with ψ→ φ ∈ c
a,b
X (t). Since
ψ ∈ ca,bX (u), there is a ρ ∈ u with ρ a,b ψ . Thus by Lemma 31, RWQa,b ρ→ψ . So
since t a,b ψ→ φ , it follows by Lemma 11 that t a,b ρ→ φ . Thus ρ→ φ ∈ ca,bX (t).
So φ ∈ ca,bX (t)u.
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Lemma 40. If ca,bX (s) ⊆ p ∈ ΠX , then there is a t with c
a,b
X (s) ≤ c
a,b
X (t) ≤ p and
ca,bX (t) ∈ΠX .
Proof. This is a straightforward application of the Lindenbaum Lemma for Xa,b-
theories, so left to the reader.
Definition 12. For finite sets of variables X ⊆ Y , we let t⇓YX = t ∩LX and t⇑YX =
cY (t)
Lemma 41. ⇓ and ⇑ are monotonic; t⇓ZY⇓YX = t⇓ZX ; t⇑ZY⇑YX = t⇑ZX ; RWQX⇑YX =
RWQY ; t⇓YX⇑YX ⊆ t; and t⇑YX⇓YX = t
Proof. Essentially immediate from definitions.
Lemma 42. (t∗Y )⇓YX = (t⇓YX )∗X .
Proof. φ ∈ (t∗Y )⇓YX iff φ ∈ t∗Y ∩LX iff φ ∈ LX and ¬φ 6∈ t iff ¬φ 6∈ t ∩LX iff
φ ∈ (t⇓YX )∗X .
Lemma 43. ΠY⇓YX = ΠX .
Proof. We leave showing ΠY⇓YX ⊆ ΠX to the reader. For the converse, let p ∈ ΠX
and let θ = LX − p. Since p is prime, θ is closed under disjunctions and clearly
cY (p) is a Y -theory that does not intersect θ . Thus, by the Lindenbaum Lemma
applied to Y -theories, there is a prime Y -theory q with p⊆ cY (p)⊆ q and q∩θ = /0.
It follows that q⇓YX = p. So ΠY⇓YX ⊇ΠX .
Lemma 44. (t∗X )⇑YX = (t⇑YX )∗Y and (ts)⇑YX = t⇑YX s⇑YX .
Proof. For the first of these, let φ ∈ (t∗X )⇑YX . Then τX φ for some τX ∈ t∗X . Since
τX ∈ t∗X , ¬τ 6∈ t. Thus t 6 ¬τ . So ¬τ 6∈ t⇑YX . Thus τ ∈ (t⇑YX )∗Y , so since (t⇑YX )∗Y is
a theory, φ ∈ (t⇑YX )∗Y as well.
For the second, first note that since t ⊆ t⇑YX and s ⊆ s⇑YX , the left-to-right
containment is obvious. For the other direction, let φ ∈ t⇑YX s⇑YX . Then there is
ψ ∈ s⇑YX = cY (s) with ψ → φ ∈ t⇑YX = cY (t). Since ψ ∈ cY (s), there is σ ∈ s with
σ  ψ . Thus by the Deduction Lemma, σ → ψ ∈ RWQ. Thus, since ψ → φ ∈ t,
σ → φ ∈ t as well. So there is a τ ∈ t with τ  σ → φ and thus by the De-
duction Lemma, τ → (σ → φ) ∈ RWQ. Let Y − X = {y1, . . . ,yn}. Then by R3,
∀y1 . . .∀yn(τ → (σ → φ)) ∈ RWQ. So since τ ∈ t ⊆ LX and σ ∈ s ⊆ LX , A11
and a bit of fiddling give that τ → (σ → ∀y1 . . .∀ynφ) ∈ RWQ. Thus since τ ∈ t,
σ →∀y1 . . .∀ynφ ∈ t. So since σ ∈ s, ∀y1 . . .∀ynφ ∈ ts. Thus φ ∈ (ts)⇑YX .
Lemma 45. (tu⇑YX )⇓YX ⊆ t⇓YX u.
Proof. Let φ ∈ (tu⇑YX )⇓YX . Then φ ∈LX and there is a ψ ∈ u⇑YX with ψ → φ ∈ t.
Since ψ ∈ u⇑YX , for some ρ ∈ u, ρ  ψ . Thus ρ → ψ ∈ RWQ. Let Y − X =
{y1, . . . ,yn}. Then using R3 and A11, we see that ρ → ∀y1 . . .∀ynψ ∈ RWQ. It
follows that ∀y1 . . .∀ynψ ∈ u. But repeated applications of A10 and R1 give that
∀y1 . . .∀ynψ → ψ ∈ RWQ. So since ψ → φ ∈ t, ∀y1→ ∀ynψ → φ ∈ t as well. But
also ∀y1→∀ynψ → φ ∈LX . So ∀y1→∀ynψ → φ ∈ t⇓YX , so φ ∈ t⇓YX u.
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Lemma 46. IY (t)(P)∩DomiX = IX (t⇓YX )(P).
Proof. Immediate from definitions.
Lemma 47. If t⇓YX ⊆ a, then for some p ∈ΠY , t ⊆ p and t⇓YX = a.
Proof. Let s= cY (t∪a) and let θ =LX−a Clearly s is a Y -theory. I claim s∩θ = /0.
To see this, suppose φ ∈ s∩ θ . Then t ∪ a  φ . So there is τ ∈ t and α ∈ a
so that τ ∧ α  φ . Thus by the Deduction Lemma, (τ ∧ α) → φ ∈ RWQ. Let
Y −X = {y1, . . . ,yn}. By fiddling, it’s clear then that (∀y1 . . .∀ynτ ∧∀y1 . . .∀ynα)→
φ ∈RWQ as well. But ∀y1 . . .∀ynτ ∈ t⇓YX ⊆ a and ∀y1 . . .∀ynα ∈ a. So ∀y1 . . .∀ynτ∧
∀y1 . . .∀ynα ∈ a, from which it follows that φ ∈ a, which is impossible. So s∩θ = /0.
Thus the Lindenbaum Lemma applied to Y -theories gives that there is a p∈ΠY with
s ⊆ p and p∩θ = /0. Since a ⊆ s and t ⊆ s, a ⊆ p and t ⊆ p. And since p∩θ = /0,
p⊆ a, showing that p has the required features.
Lemma 48. If a and b are in X, then ca,bY (t⇑
Y





Proof. If φ ∈ ca,bY (t⇑
Y
X ), then φ ∈LY and t⇑YX a,b φ . Thus, τY a,b φ for some τY ∈
t⇑YX . So by Lemma 31, RWQa,b τY → φ . Since τY ∈ t⇑YX , τX  τY for some τX ∈ t.
So RWQτX → τY . Thus, by fiddling, RWQa,b τX → φ . Let Y −X = {y1, . . . ,yn}.
Then by repeated application of R3, RWQa,b ∀y1 . . .∀yn(τX → φ). So by fiddling,












Now let φ ∈ ca,bX (t)⇑
Y
X . Then τ φ for some τ ∈ c
a,b








X ). Finally, since
τ φ , this gives that φ ∈ ca,bY (t⇑
Y








X , completing the proof.
Lemma 49. If a ∈ Y −X and b ∈ X, then cb,aY (t⇑
Y
X )⇓YX ⊆ t
Proof. Let φ ∈ cb,aY (t⇑
Y




X ). So t⇑YX b,a φ , and
thus τY b,a φ for some τy ∈ t⇑YX . And since τY ∈ t⇑YX , τX  τY for some τX ∈ t. It
follows that τX b,a φ . Thus by Lemma 31, τX (a//b)→ φ(a//b) ∈ RWQ. But since
a ∈Y −X and τX and φ are in LX , a does not occur in τX or in φ . So τX (a//b) = τ
and φ(a//b) = φ . So in fact τX → φ ∈ RWQ. Thus since t is a theory and τX ∈ t,
φ ∈ t as well, as required.
Lemma 50. for all V ⊇ X, t⇑VX⇓VW = t⇓XY ⇑WY , as long as X ∩W = Y
Proof. Let Y ∩Z = X , W ⊇ Y and let φ ∈ t⇓YX⇑ZX . Then τX → φ ∈ RWQ for some
τX ∈ t⇓YX = t ∩LX . Since τX ∈ t, τX ∈ t⇑WY . But then since LX ⊆LZ , we also have
that τX ∈ ⇑WY ⇓WZ . So t⇓YX⇑ZX ⊆ t⇑WY ⇓WZ .
Now let φ ∈ t⇑WY ⇓WZ = t⇑WY ∩LZ . Then τY → φ ∈ RWQ for some τY ∈ t. Let
Z −Y = {z1, . . . ,zn}. Then by repeated application of R3, ∀z1 . . .∀zn(τY → φ) ∈
RWQ as well. So by fiddling, τY → ∀z1 . . .∀znφ ∈ RWQ. So since τY ∈ t, clearly
∀z1 . . .∀znφ ∈ t. But clearly ∀z1 . . .∀znφ ∈LZ∩Y =LX . So in fact ∀z1 . . .∀znφ ∈ t⇓YX ,
from which it follows that φ ∈ t⇓YX⇑ZX .
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Theorem 6. The data M, cb, ⇓, ⇑ define a stratified model.
Proof. Immediate from the above.
Lemma 51. If φ ∈LX , then M,X , t  φ iff φ ∈ t.
Proof. By induction on φ . The cases for atoms and conjunctions are trivial. For the
conditional case, first suppose that φ→ψ ∈ t. Let M,X ,u φ . Then by IH, φ ∈ u. So
ψ ∈ tu, and thus, again by IH, M,X , tuψ . Now suppose instead that φ→ψ 6∈ t. Let
u = cX (φ). Clearly φ ∈ u. So by IH, M,X ,u  φ . Suppose ψ ∈ tu. Then ρ → ψ ∈ t
for some ρ ∈ u. But if ρ ∈ u, then φ → ρ ∈ RWQ, and hence φ → ψ ∈ t, which is a
contradiction. So ψ 6∈ tu. Thus by IH, M,X , tu 6 ψ . So M,X , t 6 φ → ψ .
For the universal case, first suppose M,X , t  ∀kφ(k). Then there are Y ) X and
y ∈ Y −X so that M,Y, t⇑YX  φ(y). So by IH, φ(y) ∈ t⇑YX = cY (t). So t  φ(y). So
for some τ ∈ t, τ → φ(y) ∈ RWQ. Since τ ∈ t ⊆LX and y ∈ Y −X , it follows by
some fiddling that τ →∀kφ(k) ∈ RWQ as well. So since τ ∈ t, ∀kφ(k) ∈ t as well.
Finally, suppose ∀kφ(k) ∈ t. Let Y ) X and y ∈ Y . Then φ(y) ∈ cY (t) = t⇑YX . So
by IH, M,Y, t⇑YX  φ(y). It follows that M,X , t  ∀kφ(k) as required.
Theorem 7. If Str  φ , then φ ∈ RWQ.
Proof. Let φ ∈ LX and suppose φ 6∈ RWQ. Then φ 6∈ RWQX . So by Lemma 51,
M,X ,RWQX 6 φ . Thus Str 6 φ .
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